Panel 2b: Identities and Politics -- Friday, 17 October 2003, 3:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Johnny Goldfinger, Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
Discussant: Michael Rabinder James, Political Science, Bucknell University
Abstracts:
Daniel Cordes, “Metamorphosis: Rhetoric, Democratic Deliberation, and the Surrendering of the Self”
At the core of contemporary normative theories of democracy lies a concern with inclusive dialogue that yields consensus. The agreements may be used to evaluate the appropriateness of societal structures (Rawls) or to indirectly influence the course of policy-making (Habermas); the conversation may be largely imaginary and self-envisaged, or actual and in real-time. The participation of individuals who differ sharply from one another in knowledge, background, and prejudice is made plausible by the standard theoretical stipulation that only the arguments that issue from such differences are fit for common discussion, not the assertion of those differences themselves. This stipulation allows the democratic process to be very inclusive, and simultaneously protects the uniqueness of individual difference by placing it outside of the discursive arena.
In tension with the respect that such
theories accord multicultural plurality and individual difference, however, is
the transformative power that a communicative process can have on its
participants. Not only may an interlocutor change the minds of others, not only
may her own opinions and beliefs be changed, but her own fundamental and even
non-propositional understanding of who she is may begin to mutate before her
eyes. This metamorphosis can be startling and even frightening, and is
essentially not discussed at all in normative theory.
It is well understood that a process which begins by accepting an
extraordinarily heterogeneous set of participants may end by yielding
undifferentiated homogeneity: such is the common understanding of the scientific
method, or any discussion which sets truth as its objective. Democracy, as it is
commonly understood at least, is nevertheless ostensibly concerned not with
truth but with provisional consensus. In the current day, moreover, democracy is
thought to positively prohibit the wrenching transformation of the individuals
and sub-societal groupings that participate in it. Yet such seems to be the
necessary concomitant of the dialogic focus of contemporary theory.
The interlocutor who, with alarm, detects within himself the incipient stages of a movement that looks to end in his own metamorphosis is in the same position as that subject of existentialist theory in Heidegger who becomes aware of the boundaries of his own existence in time. This paper draws upon existentialism to sharply define the choices that democratic theory would force upon many individuals in contemporary society. One choice might be to reject the process of slow transformation and cling instead to an ideal instantiation of ones past self (Kierkegaard). Another might be to construct narratives that link ones past self with ones metamorphosized future identity and thus deny any fundamental difference (Ricoeur). A third might be the rejection of any kind of time-grounded identity at all (Kant). The paper aims to show the fruitfulness of this bringing to bear of existentialist theories of time and identity upon normative democratic theory.
Edmund Fong, “The Hermeneutics of Race”
For a number of years now, scholars interested in questions of multiculturalism have begun to explore the nuances of recognition posed by a variety of forms of cultural difference. But the specificities of race, given its lineage as an imputed category, poses special difficulties for any recognition schema. Consequently, the literature remains trapped between a salutory normative inclusion of race and a critical exclusion of it within multicultural prescriptions. I propose to explore the difficulties raised in any hermeneutics of race by examining the Gadamerian roots of Charles Taylor's influential conception of recognition and the challenge posed to it by the debate between Gadamer and Habermas over the rehabilitation of prejudice and tradition. In gaining a better understanding of this hermeneutic dilemma, perhaps we can better conceptualize alternatives to the double-binds of race; between a hermeneutics of trust and a hermeneutics of suspicion.
Susan Hekman, “Identity Politics: The Personal and the Political”
The advent of identity politics in the liberal polity has challenged some of the fundamental presuppositions of liberal political theory and practice. It has also generated a wide-ranging controversy among political and social theorists. Defenses and criticisms of identity politics abound. Much acrimony but little agreement has emerged from these discussions. In this paper I argue that both the criticisms and defenses of identity politics are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of identity and its role in the political process. My thesis is that each of us possesses both a personal and a public identity and that it is the confusion between these two aspects of identity that stands in the way of an understanding of the phenomenon of identity politics. Personal and public identities are complexly related. The public identity under which we are subsumed profoundly influences the personal identities each of us develops. Despite this, I nevertheless argue that citizens possess both a personal and a public identity and that it is our public, not our personal identities that are at issue in identity politics. Identity politics is about affirming, denying, or challenging the public identities that define us. Aspects of our personal identities generate such affirmations, denials, and challenges, but political action is concerned with the constitution of public identities. I argue that understanding identity politics in terms of the operation of public identities clarifies many of the issues surrounding this phenomenon in contemporary politics.